The Credibility of Power

이 논문은 국가들이 적국의 군사적 위협의 신뢰도(혹은 신빙성, credibility)를 판단할 때 어떠한 근거를 바

탕으로 판단하느냐에 대한 연구이다. 저자는 국가들이 적국의 위협의 신뢰도를 해당 국가가 과거에 얼마

나 자신이 내건 공약을 이행했는가에 관한 행적을 바탕으로 판단한다는 "Past Action" 이론과 국가들은 해

당 국가의 국력과 해당 국가가 쟁점 이슈를 얼마나 가치 있게 여기는가라는 두 변수가 위협의 신뢰도를 결

정한다는 "Current Calculus" 이론을 검증하고 있으며, 경험적 검증을 통해 후자가 더 설득력 있는 이론임

을 주장하고 있다. 이 리뷰에서 나는 그 의견에 전반적으로 동의하나, 역사적 자료 해석에서 저자가 이론을 

암묵적으로 수정하고 있는 것 같다는 비판을 제기해 보았다. 

The Credibility of Power

A Short Review

Kyung Won, Suh

 

Daryl G. Press, “The Credibility of Power,” International Security 29-3 (2004/05), pp. 136-169.

 

Summary

  In this article, Daryl G. Press aims at testing two competing theories on the causes of the credibility of military threats. The first, “past action” theory, holds that the history of keeping or breaking commitment influences the credibility of military threats. The second, “current calculus” theory, rebuts this idea and argues that the balance of power and the interests at stake are powerful determinants of credible threats. By tracing the German decision-making process in the 1930s, Press contends that even these cases offer an easy test for “past action” theory, empirical evidence largely supports “current calculus” theory. The variations in the British and French credibility highly depend on the balance of power at a certain period, not their past actions of fulfilling or abandoning commitments.

 

Why Choose It?

  As mentioned before, one of my research topics is to examine the deterrence-enhancing effects of formal alliances by using qualitative methods. Specifically, I plan to write a research paper on investigating whether or not the causal chains work as posited by game-theoretic approaches to military alliances which argue that formal agreements of an alliance enhance the deterrent power of the alliance. As a preliminary research, therefore, I choose this article to develop a counter argument of game theories on military alliances.

 

The Detailed Description of the Theories

  The author’s “current calculus” theory explicitly rejects the idea of “past action” theory. The former believes that when calculating credibility, the state asks two questions: does the adversary have enough capabilities to carry out its threats and achieve purposes? Furthermore, are the values of the interests at stake sufficient to justify the costs the adversary would likely pay if it behaves following its threats? If the answers are yes, then the threats should be credible; if the answers not, then the threats void.

  However, the latter asserts that the adversary’s history of fulfilling commitments likely determines the credibility of the threats. When the adversary has the history of breaking commitments, then its threats will be less credible. If the adversary has the history of fulfilling commitments, then others believe the threats are likely to be carried out.

 

Methodological Choices and Empirical Evidence

  The author selects three cases to test two theories: the Austrian, Sudetenland, and Polish crises. The author argues that the main benefit of selection criteria is that it offers an easy test for past action theory because in these cases leaders should use past behaviors of the adversaries to calculate their credibility if past action theory is true. Put differently, leaders should measure the credibility on the basis of the past history of the adversaries in recent, salient, and similar historical events.

 

  In addressing historical evidence, the author implicitly changes the key elements of current calculus theory. When examining the Austrian and Sudetenland crises, he argues that although German key decision makers perceived the balance of power as heavily tilted against Germany, which is a correct perception of the “real” balance of power, Hitler did have a diametrically opposite view: The British Empire and France were ill-prepared for war. On the basis of this “perceived” balance of power, not the records of past actions of UK and France, therefore, Hitler considered his enemies’ military threats as incredible.What makes this way of interpreting evidence problematic is that the original version of current calculus theory centers on the “real” balance of power, not the “perceived” balance of power. Therefore, it naturally leads some doubts on the validity of current calculus theory; specifically, a question that the author “may” revise the key elements of the theory when facing falsifying evidence can be raised.

In summary, although the author advances a realist theory of credibility in a convincing way, his way of collecting empirical evidence may lead him to reach a false conclusion that the evidence supports his theory, which is actually a spurious interpretation.